

ANDREAS PANAGOPOULOS, **Captives and Hostages in the Peloponnesian War**, Athens, Grigoris Publications 1978, pp.258, paper, price not stated.

The work in question is an expanded version of Dr Panagopoulos' Ph. D. thesis, presented to the University of London. It deals, as the title suggests, with the treatment of captives and hostages during the course of the Peloponnesian War, and draws the conclusion that, while the treatment of hostages was fairly consistent, and usually honourable, that of captives, despite interludes of humanity, became progressively harsher as the urgency of the struggle intensified. This work is the first to deal exclusively with the problems of captives and hostages in the Peloponnesian War in their various categories. It becomes clear, from Dr Panagopoulos' work, that the treatment of captives during this period was directly related to the degree of stress felt by their captors when the fate of the prisoners was resolved, though this point is not made in so many words. Indeed, Dr Panagopoulos shows a marked disinclination to state the obvious, so I must do it for him. As he has pointed out (p. 19), Thucydides describes war as a βίαιος διδάσκαλος (III. 82. 2) : the Greek contains an ambiguity, in that war may be an ungentle teacher, who also urges men to violent deeds. It appears to be in illustration of this point that the study has been made. It may perhaps seem impertinent that an outsider might deliberate on the following point, but since it is impossible to deal with classics without any political bias, it may be as well for the bias to be pointed out. Panagopoulos emphasizes (p. 28) the view of Agesilaos, as expressed by Xenophon (*Agesilaos* 1. 21) that 'captives should be considered as men to be detained, and not animals to be punished', and that of Plato (*Rep.* V. 471 b-c) that 'moderation should be used by Greeks in dealing with Greeks, since he (Plato) regarded any conflict between Greeks as civil war': one cannot help wondering if this book is written partly in sorrow at certain political events in Greece rather less remote than the Peloponnesian War.

Panagopoulos begins with methodological soundness in both the section on captives and in that on hostages, by defining what, in Thucydides' terms, a captive or a hostage is. He makes the easily-overlooked point (p. 24) that there is a difference between a captive taken in the heat of battle, and the population of a city captured by siege. The exigencies of the thesis have compelled Panagopoulos to keep strictly to his subject, but naturally his work is going to set his readers thinking. There are not such worlds of difference between the treatment of prisoners in the Homeric poems and of those taken in the war which Panagopoulos has made his subject. A Homeric captive is caught alive usually in a duel, and automatically attempts to sell himself for ransom (*Iliad* VI. 46—50, X. 378—81, XI. 131—5), which his captor is normally prepared to allow, until persuaded by someone else to dispose more conclusively of the captive. It is true that Lycaon, whom Achilles had caught once before and sold as a slave (*Iliad* XXI. 35—41) is offered no quarter by Achilles when he beseeches him (XXI. 74—96), but in this example Achilles has not yet avenged Patroclus and is in no mood to spare Trojans (XXI. 99—113). But Agamemnon (*Iliad* XI. 136—47) makes no offer of quarter, and rather has the idea of wiping out the whole Trojan population

ἑτῶν μή τις ὑπεκφύγοι αἰπὸν ὄλεθρον
χειρᾶς θ' ἡμετέρας, μηδ' ὄν τινα γαστέρι μήτηρ
κοῦρον ἔόντα φέροι, μηδ' ὄς φύγοι, ἀλλ' ἅμα πάντες
'Ἰλλοῦ ἐξαπολοῖατ' ἀκήδεστοι καὶ ἄφαντοι.'

(*Iliad* VI. 57—60).

This idea occurs elsewhere in early warfare, for Ramses III boasts of his enemies, the Sea peoples, that 'I slew the Denyen in their isles, the Thekel and the Peleset were made ashes. The Sherden and the Weshwesh of the Sea, they were made as those that exist not' (Papyrus Harris § 403, J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt; Historical Documents* IV, Chicago 1906, p. 201). The Ionian revolt, according to the Herodotean account, led to the sacking and burning of the towns by the Persians and the enslavement of some of the youth (Herodotus VI. 32), though Miletus was dismantled, with the men massacred, the women and children enslaved, and anyone left over deported (Herodotus XI. 18—21). This was much the same kind of treatment as was later meted out to the Melians by the Athenians (Thucydides VI. 116. 3—4). These extreme cases reflect the degree of hostility felt by the victorious party, and it is this hostile element which introduces the element of retribution (Panagopoulos pp. 28 & 54) in dealing with prisoners. Similarly, the Athenian prisoners of the Syracusans were treated with great cruelty as a result of the Syracusans' anger at having been invaded in what was not a normal war between cities but an attempt to add the Syracusans to the empire: as Panagopoulos points out (pp. 143—4), a future invasion by Athens, after having had this expedition wiped out, was most unlikely; this is the intellectual principle behind a war of annihilation.

Panagopoulos' illustration, drawn from Thucydides' account, of the torture of the oligarchic captives by the Corcyrean demos (pp. 70—72) is a good example of the treatment of captives when the hatred felt against them has become more of a personal nature. It has a strikingly close parallel in the 1939—45 war, in which the personal cruelty of individual commanders was sometimes unchecked. I refer to the account of Maurice Lampe, an internee at Mauthausen concentration camp, of the murder of a group of forty-seven American, British and Dutch airmen, who had, it should be said, presumably been engaged in area bombing — the euphemism current at the time — and condemned to death by a German Court. But an element of personal sadism may perhaps be inferred from the statement of the SS officer who had earlier received a convoy of French deportees: 'Germany needs your arms. You are, therefore, going to work, but I want to tell you that never again will you see your families. Who enters this camp, will leave it only by the chimney of the crematorium' (I cite the British publication of the Proceedings of the Nuremberg Tribunal, *The Trial of the German Major War Criminals*, HMSO 1946, Part 5, p. 169). These airmen arrived at the camp in September 1944, and «The 47 were led barefoot to the quarry (very reminiscent of Syracuse: but here the prisoners worked). . . . At the bottom of the steps they loaded stones on the backs of these poor wretches and they had to carry them to the top. The first ascent was made with stones weighing 25 to 30 kilos and was accompanied by blows. Then they were made to run down. For the second ascent the stones were still heavier, and whenever the poor wretches sank under their burden, they received kicks and blows with a bludgeon — even stones were hurled at them (it is this which is reminiscent of

Corcyra). . . . Twenty-one had died on the first day. The twenty-six others died the following morning.' (Part 5. p. 170).

On the other hand, where the exasperation is not so great, prisoners in the Peloponnesian War appear frequently to have been used as barter 'because of political and strategic expediency' (Panagopoulos p. 101). Even so, the Spartan captives from Sphacteria, for the sake of whom the Spartans were prepared to make very favourable terms, were not fully exploited by the Athenians, who thought that they could get what they wanted by fighting, 'and so they thought that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they liked' (Panagopoulos p. 80; Thucydides IV. 21. 2).

The whole problem of whether it was dishonourable to be captured at all is touched on by Panagopoulos in his emphasis on the Athenians' surprise at the capture of the Spartans on Sphacteria (p. 81), and in his mention on the story of the Spartan captive at Athens, who, when asked whether the Spartans who had fallen were brave (*καλοὶ κἀγαθοί*), replied that the arrow was valuable if it only picked out the brave (*τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς*. Panagopoulos p. 81 n. 2: Thucydides IV. 40. 1—2). He makes no contrast with the modern notion that it is the duty of an officer and a gentleman to escape. Indeed, the most notable escape in the Peloponnesian War was that of Alcibiades (Panagopoulos pp. 154—5; Xenophon, *Hellenica* I. 1. 10), and he was no gentleman! This notion of having a duty to escape is so strong in present day thinking that the shooting of fifty prisoners of war, officers of the Royal Air Force, who were captured while attempting to escape from «Stalag Luft III» at Sagan, and shot after their capture . . . in the night of 24th—25th March 1944' (*The Trial of the German Major Criminals*, HMSO 1946, Part 7, p. 326) was considered a crime even by German officers (e.g. General von Graevenitz, *loc. cit.* Part 11, p. 95). Panagopoulos makes the further point that the occasional liberation by the Athenians of slaves who fell into their hands was not a case of humanity, but was done for reasons of propaganda, and to gain the services of the slaves in question (e.g. p. 149, the captives taken on the Chian ships in 412).

It is not often apparent that Panagopoulos is writing in a language which is not his own, and the book contains a fair number of references to works of scholarship in French and German. There are a few misprints (one of them rather serious, p. 189, 'You must think of their land as though it was a hostage in your position'—for 'possession'), but the general standard of presentation is high. The work should provide a useful collection of evidence, for the sociologists, perhaps, as well as for classical scholars.

M. J. ALDEN, University of Belfast.

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ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΟΥ ΑΘ. ΓΛΑΒΙΝΑ, *Τὸ αὐτοκέφαλον τῆς ἐν Ἀλβανίᾳ Ὁρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας ἐπὶ τῇ βάσει ἀνεκδότων ἐγγράφων*. Ἰωάννινα 1978, σχ. 8ο, σσ. 446 + 8 εἰκόνες. (Ἐκδοσις IMIAX, ἀρ. 2).

Τὸ παρελθὸν ἔτος ἐξεδόθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἰδρύματος Μελετῶν Ἰονίου καὶ Ἀδριατικοῦ χώρου τῆς Ἑταιρείας Ἑπαιρωτικῶν Μελετῶν καὶ ὑπ' αὐξ. ἀριθ. 2 περισπού-