A game theory approach to institutional change
Part of : Αρχείον οικονομικής ιστορίας ; Vol.XVII, No.2, 2005, pages 63-90
Issue:
Pages:
63-90
Author:
Abstract:
The subject of lock–in or path dependence has raised considerable interest in its various aspects. Economists have distinguished three different areas of lock–in: institutional, technological and spatial. In this paper we adapt for the first time a model that combines the new institutionalism approach with the mathematics of game theory in the form of signaling games in order to formulate a specific theory of path dependence and regime change, followed by the historical evidence of one specific case of sudden shock and change of regimes that take the form of what we call ‘turn to the sea’. We present the case of Ancient Athens focusing in particular on its finances and solutions concerning public choice.
Subject:
Subject (LC):
Keywords:
Signaling games, lock–in, institutional change, Ancient Athens, state finance, public choice.
Notes:
JEL classification: N00, N01, N13
