Parmenides : rationalism falls short of truth
Part of : Philosophical inquiry ; Vol.XIX, No.3-4, 1997, pages 54-61
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54-61
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Parmenides is traditionally understood as defending monism but the interpretation 1 will argue for establishes that Parmenides did not set out to defend anything. Instead, Parmenides set out to present a challenge by drawing this intolerable monistic conclusion from a chain of seemingly valid deductive arguments. The ambition of this paper is to show that if truth can only be derived on the basis of laws of logic a priori then we must give up empirical truths of the world; and hence the application of truth. Hence, according to Parmenides, there is an asymmetrical relation between truths of logical and empirical truths of fact. From this it follows that it would be a mistake to believe that truths of logic apply to the world. Strength for this view will be drawn from (a) the recommended rationalism found in the Way of Truth, and (b) the obvious paradoxical end that this derives, radical monism, as well as (c) the dialectic structure of the poem. Since from (a)-(c) the Way of Truth will be shown to be insightful only within the confines of a thinking subject, solipsism will follow, which will itself also be devoid of content. This conclusion would suggest that Parmenides either expects the reader to isolate the faulty premise(s) or argument which is responsible for this obviously false monism, or s/he is expected to draw the conclusion that rationalism is itself a self-contained net of logical inferences which is, in fact, inapplicable and uninformative with respect to how things are in the world. I will argue for the latter view.
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