132-147

• Τσακισταρά, Δέσποινα
• Sdrolias, Labros
• Κάκκος, Νικόλαος
• Πολύζος, Σεραφείμ

The illegal synergy of independent firms with similar activity aiming to create monopolistic coalitions was unusual for the Greek economic reality few years ago. Yet, the globalisation of markets and the intense competition encouraged the appointment of dominant firms that establish cooperation (cartel) to mainly achieve higher profits for their members. Despite the Greek Competition Committee's imposition of big fines to firms that are (presumably) involved in a cartel, such firms do not accept the existence of collusion; instead, they attribute the final high milk price to the high production costs and the free market. The existence of a cartel in the Greek milk market would affect the local market in both financial and social ways. This empirical study explores the likely existence of a cartel responsible for milk prices in Greece. Different approaches are used in an attempt to find supporting evidence. First, an econometric analysis is undertaken to examine the impact of milk production costs on fluid milk prices. The resulting correlation between production price and consumer milk price is not very high and a likely collusive conduct involving consumer milk prices cannot be rejected. Second, based on the estimation of Lerner indices during the 1990-2008 period the evolution of market power in the Greek dairy products sector is analysed. The results reveal that the Greek milk market operates under oligopoly conditions, which indirectly strengthens the argument for a cartel.

• Economics and Business
• Computer and information sciences

• Επιχείρηση
• Economics
• Statistics

milk, cartel, Greek market, econometric approach

Περιέχει πίνακες, διαγράμματα και βιβλιογραφία, JEL Classification: C19, D43, L13