A new understanding of Aristotle’s ‘dualism’ in the De Anima
Part of : Philosophical inquiry ; Vol.37, No.3-4, 2013, pages 12-31
Issue:
Pages:
12-31
Author:
Subject (LC):
Keywords:
διαλεκτικός, affections of the soul, πάθηση της ψυχής
References (1):
- 1 Green, Ch., ‘The Thoroughly Modem Aristotle: Was He Really a Functionalist in’ History of Psychology, 1, 8-20, 1998.On the last page of his per his Conclusion, Green writes:Nussbaum and Putnam have, I think, gotten things approximately right here (though there is an attempt to assimilate Aristotle to Wittgenstein near the end of the piece of which one should be deeply suspicious).2 Nussbaum, M. C. and Putnam, H. (1992). ‘Changing Aristotle's mind’. In Nussbaum, M. C. and Rorty, A. O. (Eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima (pp. 27-56). Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 27-66.3 Wilkes, K. ‘Psuchê versus the Mind’. In Nussbaum, M.C. and Rorty, A.O. (Eds.), Essays on Aristotle s De Anima, p. 121.4 Op.cit., p. 124.5 Ibid.6 Op.cit., p. 125.On p. 124 Wilkes had declared that she is not concerned with functionalism in its connection to philosophical or common sense psychology. I find the link between philosophical and common sense psychology very telling; to pursue this line, however, is beyond the limits of the present work.7 Op.cit., p. 124.8 Ibid.5 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 I owe the example on the relation between software and hardware to my graduate student (Bogazici University, Philosophy), Hiiseyin Kuyumcuoglu. Hiiseyin Kuyumcuoglu kindly offered to share his computer engineering expertise with me. On p. 3,1 have transfered verbatim his electronic answer to my questions on this issue.13 Wilkes, op.cit., p. 125.14 Hilary Putnam, ‘Philosophy and Our Mental Life’ in Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol.2, Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 76 and p. 92.15 Quoted by David Charles in his paper Aristotle’s Psychological Theory, on p. 4. The paper appeared in Boston Area Colloquium 2007.1 find this translation of De Anima 403b 17-19 excellent and philosophically very appropriate, in stark contrast to J. A. Smith’s translation of αχώριστα τής φυσικής ύλης των ζώων by‘the affections of the soul are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life’.This reference to a material substramm points exactly to a reading of Aristotle that Charles -rightly- tries to block.16 Charles, David, ‘Aristotle’s Psychological Theory’, Boston Area Colloquium, 2007, pp. 6-7.17 Op.cit., p. 7.18 Op.cit., p. 8.19 Ibid.20 Op. cit., p. 15.21 See Jaegwon Kim’s Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). CUP, 1993and his Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy), Princeton University Press, 2007.22 Charles, op.cit., p. 16.23 Ibid.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Cohen, M. C., ‘Hylomorphism and Functionalism.’ In Nussbaum, M.C. and Rorty, A.O. (Eds.), Essays on Aristotle s De Anima, p.75.27 Wilkes, op.cit. p. 126.28 See Norman Malcolm, Knowledge and Certainty. Essays and Lectures, Prentice- Hall, 1963.29 See ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ - ΑΠΑΝΤΑ 40 -Περί ψυχής. ΚΑΚΤΟΣ 229 «ΟΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ», comment no. 86, p. 299. (In M. Greek)30 Such is Myles Bumyeat’s position in ‘Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind still Credible? (A Draft)’. In Nussbaum, M. C. and Rorty, A. O. (Eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima (pp. 27-56). Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 18-29.All quotations from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations are from Wittgenstein L., Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Basil Blackwell, (last edition) 1989 .Apart from the works refered to above, the following have also been consulted:Armstrong D. M., and Malcolm, N., Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of the Mind. (Great Debates in Philosophy).Blackwell, 1984.Barnes, M. Schofield, & R. Sorabji (Eds.), Articles on Aristotle: Voi. 4. Psychology and aesthetics. Duckworth. (Originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1971-2)Cockbum, D. (Ed.), Human Beings (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements), CUP, 1991.Cockbum, D., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Souls, Science and Human Beings. Paigrave Macmillan, 2001.Durrant, M. (Ed.) Aristotle's De anima in focus. Routledge, 1993.Everson, S. (1995). ‘Psychology’. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Aristotle CUP, 1995, pp. 68-194.Robinson, H. M. (1983). ‘Aristotelian dualism.’ In J. Annas (Ed.), Oxford studies in ancient philosophy (Voi. l,pp. 123-144) Clarendon Press, 1983.Shields, C. ( ‘Soul and body in Aristotle.’ In J. Annas (Ed.), Oxford studies in ancient philosophy (Voi. 6, pp. 103-136) Clarendon Press, 1988.Sorabji, R. ‘Body and soul in Aristotle.’ In Philosophy, 49, (pp. 63-89), 1974.
