75-86

Unity of consiousness, self-conciousness, and the subjective character on mental states

• Παγωνδιώτης, Κώστας

In this paper I argue that we should distinguish between the subjective and the phenomenal character of experience. The former concerns the unity of the owner of experience, whereas the latter the unity of the experiential content. I suggest that there are mental states (like conscious propositional attitudes) that though they do not have phenomenal character, they do have subjective character. I criticize both a higher order access account of subjective character and an account in terms of qualia. On the positive side, I suggest that the subjective character of conscious mental states should be analyzed in terms of a pre-reflective intransitive self-consciousness constitutive of every conscious mental state. I describe this kind of self-consciousness and I argue that it is present in a way that is similar to the way the boundary of the visual field is present in our visual experience

• Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
• Psychology

• Θεωρία (Φιλοσοφία)
• Φιλοσοφία
• Ψυχολογία

Η συγγραφή αυτού του κειμένου χρηματοδοτήθηκε από το ερευνητικό πρόγραμμα «Καραθεοδωρή 2008»